lamindb
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill provides instructions for system-wide configuration that require elevated privileges. Specifically, in references/setup-deployment.md, it suggests using
sudoto create directories (e.g.,/system/settings) and modify file permissions and ownership (chmod,chown) when setting up a shared multi-user cache. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes biological datasets and metadata from various untrusted external sources, including files, cloud storage, and REST APIs, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through methods like
requests.get(),pd.read_sql(), andln.Artifactcreation from external files as documented in references/integrations.md and references/core-concepts.md. - Boundary markers: The documentation emphasizes using schemas and curators to define boundaries and validate data structure.
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities to write to the local filesystem and cloud storage (S3/GCS), connect to databases, and track lineage via
ln.track()across all reference files. - Sanitization: The skill explicitly instructs to validate and sanitize external content using
ln.curators.DataFrameCuratorandln.Schemadefinitions before registration. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation includes commands for installing the LaminDB suite and its dependencies from public registries using
uv pip install. This includes the corelamindbpackage, thebiontyontology module, and various optional integration extras.
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