latex-posters
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill takes untrusted user input via the
promptargument inscripts/generate_schematic.pyand passes it toscripts/generate_schematic_ai.py, which then interpolates it into an LLM prompt for image generation and quality review. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: User-provided description in
scripts/generate_schematic.pyandscripts/generate_schematic_ai.py(CLI arguments). - Boundary markers: Absent; the user prompt is appended directly to the
SCIENTIFIC_DIAGRAM_GUIDELINEStemplate. - Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via
subprocess.run(ingenerate_schematic.py), network access viarequests.post(ingenerate_schematic_ai.py), and file system write access viaopen()(for saving images and logs). - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is applied to the user-supplied prompt before it is sent to the OpenRouter API.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The wrapper script
scripts/generate_schematic.pyusessubprocess.run()to execute the internal AI generation scriptscripts/generate_schematic_ai.py. This is a standard architectural pattern for the skill's functionality, though it involves dynamic process spawning. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a bash script
scripts/review_poster.shthat executes local system utilities (such aspdfinfo,pdffonts,pdfimages, andgs) to perform quality checks on generated PDF posters. These operations are restricted to the local environment and intended for PDF metadata analysis.
Audit Metadata