speculative-decoding
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent or user to fetch source code from third-party GitHub repositories not included in the trusted vendor list.
- Evidence:
git clone https://github.com/FasterDecoding/Medusafound inSKILL.mdandreferences/medusa.md. - Evidence:
git clone https://github.com/hao-ai-lab/LookaheadDecodingfound inSKILL.mdandreferences/lookahead.md. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill proceeds to install and execute the code downloaded from external sources, which could allow for the execution of arbitrary code if the repositories are compromised.
- Evidence: The command
pip install -e .is executed within the cloned directories for both Medusa and LookaheadDecoding inSKILL.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides an interface for processing untrusted user prompts through various LLM inference techniques without utilizing boundary markers or sanitization logic.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied
promptvariables are interpolated into generation functions inSKILL.md(e.g.,target_model.generate,model.medusa_generate,lookahead.generate). - Boundary markers: Absent. No delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat the prompt as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
torch,transformers, andvllmfor model execution, and performs shell operations viagitandpipas documented inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill passes the raw prompt directly to the inference engine.
Audit Metadata