torchforge-rl-training
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs users to download assets from
meta-pytorch.organd themeta-pytorchGitHub organization. These sources are not official and utilize brand-jacking techniques to mimic trusted entities like Meta and the PyTorch Foundation. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Users are instructed to clone the
monarchlibrary from an unverified GitHub repository (github.com/meta-pytorch/monarch) and install it, allowing for the execution of arbitrary code from an untrusted source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves running shell scripts (
./scripts/install.shand./scripts/install_rocm.sh) found within the skill's file structure or referenced repositories. These scripts are not audited and can perform unauthorized actions on the host system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its handling of external data.
- Ingestion points: Training datasets are loaded from external sources like
openai/gsm8kon HuggingFace, and model-generated responses are processed for reward calculation. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or specific instructions provided to the agent to treat ingested data as untrusted or to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands, manage multi-process training jobs, and write checkpoints to disk.
- Sanitization: No validation, escaping, or filtering is applied to the data retrieved from external sources before it influences the training logic or agent behavior.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata