example-counter

Fail

Audited by Snyk on Jul 2, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis

HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

  • Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill requires generating runnable files that embed plaintext secrets/credentials (e.g., the genesis wallet seed, APP__INFRA__SECRET hex, and various storage/password env values) directly into code and Docker env/config, forcing the model to output secret values verbatim.

CRITICAL E005: Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.

  • Suspicious download URL detected (high risk: 0.70). Most listed endpoints are local services or official midnight.network API endpoints (low risk), but the direct GitHub releases link to compact-installer.sh combined with the provided curl | sh install instruction is a risky downloadable executable pattern that could deliver malware unless you verify the GitHub repo and inspect the script first.

MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).


HIGH W008: Secret detected in skill content (API keys, tokens, passwords).

  • Secret detected (high risk: 1.00). I scanned the skill for literal values that look like real credentials.

Flagged:

  • APP__INFRA__SECRET = "303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132"
  • This exact hex string appears in the root compose.yml (indexer environment) and in counter-cli/standalone.env.example. It is presented as an infrastructure secret (APP__INFRA__SECRET) — a literal secret value used by the service — so it meets the criteria for a secret (a concrete credential value present in the docs).

Ignored (not flagged) and why:

  • APP__INFRA__STORAGE__PASSWORD, APP__INFRA__PUB_SUB__PASSWORD, APP__INFRA__LEDGER_STATE_STORAGE__PASSWORD = "indexer"
  • Simple, low-entropy setup password / demo value. Per rules, simple/setup passwords are ignored.
  • GENESIS_MINT_WALLET_SEED = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001"
  • Known/test genesis seed used for standalone mode; a test/demo value (explicitly documented as the genesis wallet). Treated as non-sensitive per the "Test Agent / Quick Start" guidance.
  • SIDECHAIN_BLOCK_BENEFICIARY = "04bcf7ad3be7a5c7..."
  • This is a public key / beneficiary address (public data), not a secret.

MEDIUM W009: Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).

  • Direct money access detected (high risk: 1.00). This skill is explicitly a blockchain/web3 CLI and DApp template that creates and manages wallets, derives keys, signs transactions, constructs/balances transactions, and submits them to a Midnight network. It contains concrete crypto APIs and calls: HDWallet/seed derivation, ledger.ZswapSecretKeys/DustSecretKey, createKeystore/unshieldedKeystore.signData, signTransactionIntents, wallet.balanceUnboundTransaction / wallet.finalizeRecipe / wallet.submitTransaction, deployContract/findDeployedContract, and increment via counterContract.callTx.increment(). It also includes faucet/genesis mint usage and functions to register UTXOs for DUST generation. These are direct crypto/blockchain wallet and transaction execution capabilities (signing and sending funds/txs), which match the "Crypto/Blockchain (Wallets, Swaps, Signing)" criterion for Direct Financial Execution.

Issues (5)

W007
HIGH

Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

E005
CRITICAL

Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.

W012
MEDIUM

Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).

W008
HIGH

Secret detected in skill content (API keys, tokens, passwords).

W009
MEDIUM

Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Jul 2, 2026, 04:02 PM
Issues
5
Security Audit — snyk — example-counter