example-hello-world

HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

• Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt contains hard-coded secrets (e.g., the ALICE_SEED constant, the privateStoragePasswordProvider password literal, and Docker environment secret/password values) that the generated skill files must reproduce verbatim, which requires the LLM to output secret values directly and creates an exfiltration risk.

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MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).

• Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The prerequisites use curl to fetch and pipe an installer to sh (https://github.com/midnightntwrk/compact/releases/latest/download/compact-installer.sh), which clearly executes remote code during setup and is a required dependency (the Compact compiler) for running the skill.

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HIGH W008: Secret detected in skill content (API keys, tokens, passwords).

• Secret detected (high risk: 1.00). I scanned the skill for literal credentials that look like real, usable secrets (high-entropy API keys, passwords, or private keys). I flagged only values that are both literal and appear to provide access.

Flagged:

• src/providers.ts — privateStoragePasswordProvider returns the literal string "xK9#mQ2$pL8@nR5!vW3*". This is a concrete, non-placeholder password (strong/mixed characters, >16 chars) used to protect private state; it meets the definition of a secret and should be treated as sensitive.

Ignored (not flagged) and why:

• compose.yml: APP__INFRA__STORAGE__PASSWORD, APP__INFRA__PUB_SUB__PASSWORD, APP__INFRA__LEDGER_STATE_STORAGE__PASSWORD = "indexer" — low-security example/setup passwords, intentionally weak; treated as documentation/test values.
• compose.yml: APP__INFRA__SECRET = "3031323334353637..." — hex-encoded sequential digits (appears to decode to a repeating numeric sequence). Predictable/low entropy; looks like an example/dev secret, so ignored.
• compose.yml: SIDECHAIN_BLOCK_BENEFICIARY = "04bcf7ad..." — looks like a public key/address (not a secret), so ignored.
• src/test/hw.test.ts: ALICE_SEED = "0000...0001" — static test seed (known test vector) used for reproducible tests; per guidance test seeds / demo credentials are ignored.

No other literal high-entropy API keys, private keys (PEM blocks), or similar were found.

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MEDIUM W009: Direct money access capability detected (payment gateways, crypto, banking).

• Direct money access detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill is explicitly built to create and control blockchain wallets and to build, sign/finalize, and submit transactions. It uses Midnight-specific wallet and ledger APIs (FluentWalletBuilder, WalletFacade, ZswapSecretKeys, DustSecretKey, balanceUnboundTransaction, finalizeRecipe, submitTransaction) and higher-level contract transaction helpers (deployContract, submitCallTx). These are not generic I/O tools but concrete crypto wallet/transaction functions that enable sending on-chain transactions and managing keys (including a static seed for reproducible wallet control). Therefore it grants direct crypto/blockchain financial execution capability.