audit-code-publish
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes significant volumes of untrusted data from audited pull requests, issues, and comments.
- Evidence: The workflow in
SKILL.mdinvolves fetching and analyzing titles, bodies, and discussion threads from the forge. - Mitigation: The skill includes explicit instructions for the agent to treat audited content strictly as evidence for judgment and never as directives, which is a key defense against accidental obedience to instructions embedded in reviewed data.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill acquires authentication tokens by executing a shell command defined in a repository configuration file (
docs/agents/issue-tracker.md). - Evidence:
references/publishing.mdspecifies usingsh -cto run areview-token commandobtained from repository metadata. - Risk: If the agent is instructed to audit an untrusted repository that has modified this configuration file in a pull request, it could lead to arbitrary shell command execution in the agent's environment during the authentication phase.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Local Python scripts execute shell commands, primarily
gitand other scripts, using thesubprocessmodule. - Evidence: Observed in
scripts/build_shared_block.py,scripts/forge_packet.py, and multiple test files. - Mitigation: The commands are generally constrained to data retrieval and validation tasks using commit SHAs and filenames established during the resolution phase of the audit.
Audit Metadata