audit-code-publish

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes significant volumes of untrusted data from audited pull requests, issues, and comments.
  • Evidence: The workflow in SKILL.md involves fetching and analyzing titles, bodies, and discussion threads from the forge.
  • Mitigation: The skill includes explicit instructions for the agent to treat audited content strictly as evidence for judgment and never as directives, which is a key defense against accidental obedience to instructions embedded in reviewed data.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill acquires authentication tokens by executing a shell command defined in a repository configuration file (docs/agents/issue-tracker.md).
  • Evidence: references/publishing.md specifies using sh -c to run a review-token command obtained from repository metadata.
  • Risk: If the agent is instructed to audit an untrusted repository that has modified this configuration file in a pull request, it could lead to arbitrary shell command execution in the agent's environment during the authentication phase.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Local Python scripts execute shell commands, primarily git and other scripts, using the subprocess module.
  • Evidence: Observed in scripts/build_shared_block.py, scripts/forge_packet.py, and multiple test files.
  • Mitigation: The commands are generally constrained to data retrieval and validation tasks using commit SHAs and filenames established during the resolution phase of the audit.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 1, 2026, 03:13 AM