yandex-tracker

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from Yandex Tracker issues, including summaries, descriptions, and comments, which could be used to host malicious instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested via client.issues.find(), client.issues.get_all(), and other fetch methods described in references/search-and-reporting.md and references/collaboration.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use delimiters or explicit boundary markers when processing or summarizing external issue data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities for network operations (via the Tracker API), file system writes (generating scripts and downloading attachments), and issue modification.
  • Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering of external issue content is mentioned in the instructions.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow involves generating and executing Python scripts to perform multi-step operations.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md (Workflow step 4) and references/setup-and-auth.md (Portable execution section) instruct the agent to create self-contained Python scripts in temporary directories to combine API queries and mutations.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires an external Python dependency for its core functionality.
  • Evidence: references/setup-and-auth.md and references/openclaw.md mention the installation of the yandex_tracker_client package via pip.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 10:02 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — yandex-tracker