video-lens-recs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted video titles and descriptions from YouTube. Maliciously crafted metadata could attempt to influence the agent's behavior. This is mitigated by explicit instructions in
SKILL.mdtelling the agent to treat this content as data rather than instructions. - Ingestion points: Video metadata is fetched from YouTube RSS and the YouTube Data API in
collect.pyandyt_sources.py. - Boundary markers: Explicit instructions are provided to the agent in
SKILL.mdto treat YouTube data as informational data only. - Capability inventory: The agent has access to
BashandWritetools, and executes several local Python scripts. - Sanitization: Content is partially cleaned (e.g., removing pipe characters) before being presented in the candidate table.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto callyt-dlpand other internal utility scripts. It also provides a shell command template inSKILL.mdthat dynamically includes the user's request. There is a potential risk of command injection if the agent does not properly escape the user's input before running the resulting shell command. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The setup instructions in
references/setup.mdsuggest that macOS users grant 'Full Disk Access' to their terminal application. This permission is necessary for the 'Live Mode' feature to read browser cookie databases (e.g., Firefox), but it provides the terminal and the agent with extensive system permissions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to well-known YouTube services, including RSS feeds and the Google YouTube Data API, to retrieve video recommendations and metadata.
Audit Metadata