website-permissions
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from the repository's commit history.
- Ingestion points: The
git-stand.mjsscript reads commit titles and author names from the remote repository viagit log(found intemplates/claude/hooks/git-stand.mjs). - Boundary markers: The ingested content is wrapped in triple-bracket fences (
<<<and>>>) with an explicit warning to the agent that the content is data, not instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill enables a wide range of capabilities in
.claude/settings.json, including file system operations, package management (npm), and repository management (git,gh). - Sanitization: The script sanitizes the input by removing any sequences of three or more
<or>characters to prevent escaping the boundary markers. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill installs a persistent hook and an extensive permission allowlist to facilitate automated workflows.
- Evidence: The skill configures
.claude/settings.jsonto allow numerous developer commands without prompting and registersgit-stand.mjsas aSessionStartandUserPromptSubmithook that executes automatically during the agent's session.
Audit Metadata