AgentChat-WebSubAgent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a multi-step pipeline where output from one AI (e.g., Kimi's search results) is fed as a prompt into another (Gemini/ChatGPT/Claude). This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious content retrieved from the web or generated by a sub-agent could influence the master agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data via Step 2 (
--searchresults from Kimi) and Step 5 (--reviewcomments from ChatGPT) which are processed by the main agent and other sub-agents. - Boundary markers: While
SKILL.mdsuggests prompt templates (e.g.,待审查产出: ...), the wrapper scriptindex.jsdoes not implement programmatic delimiters or escaping to isolate untrusted content from instructions. - Capability inventory: The script
index.jshas the capability to execute the sibling skillAgentChat-OneWeb/index.js, and the master agent (Claude) has full file-system and tool access. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, filtering, or instruction-override protection is implemented in the script when interpolating sub-agent outputs into new prompts.
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