orca-cli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute local binaries including
orca,orca-ide, andorca-dev. It also explicitly directs the agent to prioritize the executable path defined in theORCA_CLI_COMMANDenvironment variable, which could allow a user or environment to redirect the agent to a malicious binary. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a 'discovery stub' pattern where it commands the agent to run
ORCA skills get orca-clito fetch the 'complete, version-matched guide'. This results in the agent loading and following instructions that are generated at runtime by a local binary, bypassing static analysis of the skill file itself. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and acting upon instructions provided by the output of the
orcabinary. - Ingestion points: Output of
ORCA skills get orca-cliandORCA status --json(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None provided; the agent is instructed to read the output and 'run the specific command you need'.
- Capability inventory: Execution of subcommands including
worktree,terminal,browser, andhandoff(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: None; the agent is told to report exact errors and follow the guide's instructions.
Audit Metadata