setup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill configuration in
assets/mcp.jsondownloads the@masonator/coolify-mcppackage from the NPM registry at runtime usingnpx. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the
@masonator/coolify-mcppackage as a project-level MCP server, running third-party code within the agent's environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a bundled local script
scripts/scaffold.jsusing Node.js to generate the deployment repository structure, render templates, and perform git operations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes bash shell built-ins (
/dev/tcpprobes) to perform network connectivity checks against the public IP of the target host to verify firewall rules. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external tool outputs, such as container logs and command results. While this is a vulnerability surface, the skill documentation in
assets/docs/platform.mdincludes explicit safety guidance, advising the agent to treat log and build output as untrusted and framed by nonce-bounded boundaries. - Ingestion points: MCP logs (
logs), command execution output (run_once), and infrastructure metadata (get_infrastructure_overview) inSKILL.mdandassets/docs/platform.md. - Boundary markers: The skill mentions that logs and build output arrive framed as untrusted data with nonce-bounded boundaries.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute arbitrary commands in containers (
run_once), write files to the local filesystem (scaffold.js), and perform network probes. - Sanitization: The skill provides explicit instructions to the agent to treat input as data and ignore instructions planted in logs.
Audit Metadata