xlsx
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
recalc.pyscript dynamically generates a LibreOffice Basic macro and writes it to the user's application configuration directory (e.g.,~/.config/libreoffice/...). This macro is then executed viasofficeto perform formula recalculation. This process can overwrite existing user macros inModule1.xbaif they do not contain the expected function string. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinrecalc.pyto execute system-level commands, specificallysofficefor spreadsheet processing andtimeout/gtimeoutfor execution control. While these are used for the skill's primary purpose, they represent high-privilege capabilities. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external spreadsheet files (.xlsx, .csv, .tsv), creating a surface where malicious instructions embedded in data could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points:
recalc.py(viaload_workbookon lines 131 and 155) and various Python snippets inSKILL.mdusingpandas.read_excelandopenpyxl.load_workbook. - Boundary markers: None identified; there are no instructions to the agent to ignore or delimit embedded content within the processed files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the file system (
wb.save), execute system commands (subprocess.run), and generate/run macros. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of spreadsheet cell values is performed before they are used in calculations or written back to files.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a discrepancy between the provided author ('kastalien-research') and the ownership statement in
LICENSE.txt('Anthropic, PBC'). This misleading metadata could cause a user to misjudge the skill's origin and safety profile.
Audit Metadata