Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyimplements a runtime monkey patch for thepypdflibrary. It dynamically replacespypdf.generic.DictionaryObject.get_inheritedwith a custom implementation at execution time to work around a specific formatting bug in the library's handling of selection lists. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted PDF documents for text extraction, table analysis, and form filling. This creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in PDF content could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through
pypdf,pdfplumber, andpdf2image(via OCR) in scripts such asextract_form_field_info.pyandconvert_pdf_to_images.py. - Boundary markers: The instructions in
forms.mdandSKILL.mdlack explicit boundary markers or warnings to the agent to treat extracted text as untrusted data. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including file system write access (
PdfWriter), complex PDF creation (reportlab), and command execution for external tools likeqpdfandpdftotext. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or escaping of extracted PDF content before it is processed by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation (
SKILL.md,reference.md) instructs the agent to install and use several third-party libraries includingpypdf,pdfplumber,reportlab,pytesseract,pdf2image,pypdfium2,pdf-lib, andpdfjs-dist. While these are well-known industry standard packages, they represent an external dependency chain.
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