higgsfield-product-photoshoot

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 8, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to install the Higgsfield CLI using a piped remote execution pattern: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh | sh. This method executes a script directly from a remote URL, which is a significant security risk as the script content could be modified at the source.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to execute higgsfield product-photoshoot create. User input collected during the pre-generation interview is interpolated directly into the shell command's arguments: --prompt "<short user-intent description from interview answers>". This creates a risk of command injection if the user provides input containing shell metacharacters like backticks or semicolons.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of untrusted user data.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided descriptions and answers to interview questions in SKILL.md are used as CLI arguments.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions wrap the interpolated user input in double quotes ("$USER_INPUT"), which provides minimal protection against escaping shell arguments.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Bash tool to execute system commands.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the user-provided strings before they are passed to the shell.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 8, 2026, 05:31 AM