higgsfield-product-photoshoot
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to install the Higgsfield CLI using a piped remote execution pattern:
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh | sh. This method executes a script directly from a remote URL, which is a significant security risk as the script content could be modified at the source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to executehiggsfield product-photoshoot create. User input collected during the pre-generation interview is interpolated directly into the shell command's arguments:--prompt "<short user-intent description from interview answers>". This creates a risk of command injection if the user provides input containing shell metacharacters like backticks or semicolons. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of untrusted user data.
- Ingestion points: User-provided descriptions and answers to interview questions in
SKILL.mdare used as CLI arguments. - Boundary markers: The instructions wrap the interpolated user input in double quotes (
"$USER_INPUT"), which provides minimal protection against escaping shell arguments. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool to execute system commands. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the user-provided strings before they are passed to the shell.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata