higgsfield-youtube-thumbnail
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains instructions to install the Higgsfield CLI by fetching a shell script fromhttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.shand piping it directly into the shell (| sh). This pattern provides a direct path for arbitrary code execution from a remote source. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads code from an external source (
raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/...) which is not under the user's control or on the provided list of trusted vendors. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to executehiggsfieldCLI commands such ashiggsfield generate createandhiggsfield model get. These commands are executed with parameters derived from user input. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user data and interpolates it into prompts for high-capability generative AI models.
- Ingestion points: The
video-topic-or-titleargument and specific scene requirements provided by the user inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill employs a structured 'Prompt contract' consisting of 11 distinct sections to define prompt structure and constraints.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to perform shell operations via the
Bashtool and thehiggsfieldCLI. - Sanitization: To mitigate command injection, the skill instructions require writing the final prompt to a temporary file (
thumbnail-prompt.txt) and piping that file to the CLI's standard input.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata