gather
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external local files, which could contain untrusted content that influences the agent's behavior. \n- Ingestion points: The skill reads
shinkoku.config.yaml,.shinkoku/progress/progress-summary.md, and.shinkoku/progress/02-assess.mdto initialize its workflow (SKILL.md). \n- Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or markers to distinguish between trusted instructions and potentially untrusted data within these files. \n- Capability inventory: The agent has file write access via the 'Write' tool and is instructed to interact with local CLI scriptsimport_data.pyandledger.py(SKILL.md). \n- Sanitization: The skill does not mention validation or sanitization steps for the data retrieved from the configuration or progress files. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to execute specific Python scripts with variable parameters. \n- Evidence: SKILL.md includes logic for runningimport_data.py payment-statement --file-path PATHandledger.py add-business-withholding --db-path DB --input FILE. While these appear to be internal tools belonging to theshinkokusuite, they constitute a command execution surface managed by the AI agent.
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