skills/keboola/cli/kbagent/Gen Agent Trust Hub

kbagent

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Agent Tasks feature allows users to define and schedule tasks that execute arbitrary command-line arguments via the cli_command action type. If an agent is manipulated into creating or modifying these tasks, it could lead to unauthorized command execution on the host running the kbagent serve process.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill supports an ai_agent task type which spawns secondary AI agents (Claude, Codex, or Gemini) with user-provided prompts. The documentation notes that if the environment variable KBAGENT_ALLOW_AI_EXTRA_ARGS is set, these agents can be passed arbitrary flags, potentially allowing an attacker to disable safety filters and achieve unrestricted code execution through the secondary agent.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill manages highly sensitive credentials, including Keboola Storage API tokens, Manage API tokens, and internal server tokens. It provides built-in mechanisms to export data from databases to local files, upload files to remote storage, and call external HTTP APIs. This combination of data access and network capabilities creates a significant surface for data exfiltration if the agent's instructions are compromised.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a high surface area for indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: The skill frequently ingests untrusted data from configuration files, SQL code snippets (transform.sql), Python scripts (code.py), and external Git repositories via the data-app validate-repo and sync pull commands.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands when the agent processes this external content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive system capabilities, including file system access, network requests, and the ability to trigger long-running jobs or arbitrary CLI commands.
  • Sanitization: There is no documented mechanism for sanitizing or escaping the content retrieved from external sources before it is analyzed by the AI or used in prompt construction.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 18, 2026, 04:56 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — kbagent