tzai-cover
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill searches for a local executable script named
tzai-imagewithin several agent-specific directories (e.g.,~/.agents/skills/tzai-image/scripts/tzai-image) and executes it usingbashto generate images. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: User-provided input is interpolated into a shell command:
bash "$ENGINE" cover --prompt "<user subject>". While wrapped in double quotes, this pattern relies on the AI agent's internal sanitization to prevent potential shell command injection if the user input contains backticks or subshells. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user data (the image subject) and incorporates it directly into a functional command execution path without explicit boundary markers or sanitization logic within the script itself.
- Ingestion points: User subject text provided via the
/tzai-coverslash command or natural language request (found inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; the user input is placed directly into the
--promptargument of the shell command. - Capability inventory: Executes shell scripts via
bashand calls thetzai-imageCLI tool (found inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not perform escaping or validation on the
<user subject>placeholder.
Audit Metadata