tzai-infographic

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a shell script to dynamically locate an executable engine by iterating through several hidden directories in the user's home path, including ~/.agents/, ~/.claude/, ~/.cursor/, and others. The identified script is then executed using bash "$ENGINE".
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: User-provided text is directly interpolated into a shell command through the --prompt "<user subject>" argument. This represents an indirect prompt injection surface where malicious user input could potentially attempt to break out of the command string if not properly sanitized by the underlying engine.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and provides instructions for installing an external dependency from the author's repository using the command npx skills add kedoupi/tzai-image-skill. It also references a gallery hosted on GitHub at https://github.com/kedoupi/tzai-image-skill.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fulfills the requirements for indirect prompt injection vulnerability:
  • Ingestion points: User input provided via the /tzai-infographic slash command (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None identified; input is wrapped in double quotes in a bash script but not otherwise sanitized.
  • Capability inventory: Execution of shell scripts and passing of arguments to a CLI tool (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: None detected in the provided skill file.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 13, 2026, 02:20 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — tzai-infographic