tzai-infographic
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a shell script to dynamically locate an executable engine by iterating through several hidden directories in the user's home path, including
~/.agents/,~/.claude/,~/.cursor/, and others. The identified script is then executed usingbash "$ENGINE". - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: User-provided text is directly interpolated into a shell command through the
--prompt "<user subject>"argument. This represents an indirect prompt injection surface where malicious user input could potentially attempt to break out of the command string if not properly sanitized by the underlying engine. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and provides instructions for installing an external dependency from the author's repository using the command
npx skills add kedoupi/tzai-image-skill. It also references a gallery hosted on GitHub athttps://github.com/kedoupi/tzai-image-skill. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fulfills the requirements for indirect prompt injection vulnerability:
- Ingestion points: User input provided via the
/tzai-infographicslash command (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified; input is wrapped in double quotes in a bash script but not otherwise sanitized.
- Capability inventory: Execution of shell scripts and passing of arguments to a CLI tool (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: None detected in the provided skill file.
Audit Metadata