xlsx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pyimplements a dynamic execution pattern where it generates C source code at runtime, compiles it into a shared library usinggcc, and injects it into the LibreOffice process via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. While documented as a shim for socket compatibility, it involves high-risk process injection techniques. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs several direct shell command executions using
subprocess.runacross different modules: scripts/office/soffice.pyexecutes thegcccompiler to create the socket shim.scripts/recalc.pyexecutes thesofficebinary with specific arguments to trigger internal macros.scripts/office/validators/redlining.pyexecutesgit difffor text comparison.scripts/recalc.pywrites a StarBasic macro file (Module1.xba) to the user's local application configuration directory (e.g.,~/.config/libreoffice/4/user/basic/Standard/).- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it processes untrusted spreadsheet files:
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via ZIP extraction in
scripts/office/unpack.pyand spreadsheet reading logic inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or explicit warnings provided to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the spreadsheet data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has extensive capabilities including subprocess calls (
soffice,gcc,git) and file-writing across multiple scripts. - Sanitization: While
defusedxmlis used to prevent XML-based attacks during parsing, the content of cells and formulas is passed to LibreOffice for execution without comprehensive sanitization.
Audit Metadata