local-testing

This module is highly invasive: it monkey-patches WebSocket and fetch to intercept and parse specific agent SSE/WS traffic, and it wraps internal chat store methods to capture message-related snapshots/deltas and stack traces on refresh/replace/dispatch. While the fragment does not show explicit outbound exfiltration, the capability to intercept and record potentially sensitive chat activity is a significant security risk and should be treated as suspicious until you confirm how the collected data is handled and whether it is transmitted. Malware confidence is limited by the absence of explicit exfiltration code in the provided snippet.

This file is a security-sensitive CLI orchestrator: it bundles local probe code, injects it into an external browser automation context via CDP ‘eval’ using stdin, captures probe results from stdout, and writes them verbatim to timestamped JSON dumps under .agent-gateway. While this fragment does not directly show classic malware actions (no hardcoded secrets, no explicit exfiltration, no persistence), the explicit traffic-interception workflow and high-privilege CDP eval injection materially increase the security/surveillance risk. Final malware likelihood cannot be confirmed without reviewing the bundled probe-events.ts, probe-dump.ts, and analyze-events.ts implementations.

This module behaves like an in-page spy/telemetry probe: it continuously samples chat application state and full page text every 200ms, stores detailed conversation-derived metadata in global window buffers, records additional event names supplied by other scripts, and provides UI automation functions to click chat tabs. While no exfiltration is shown here, the data collection scope and global accessibility present a significant privacy/confidentiality risk and warrant investigation of how the captured buffers are used elsewhere.