codex
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides patterns for cloning external repositories and checking out pull requests to be processed by an autonomous coding agent. This creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in a PR or repository could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill uses
git cloneandgh pr checkoutinSKILL.mdto bring untrusted remote code into the local environment. - Boundary markers: There are no specific delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the files it reviews or processes.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
terminaltool to execute shell commands and launch the autonomouscodexprocess, which has the capability to modify the filesystem and run code. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the remote content is performed before it is passed to the autonomous agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies extensively on the
terminaltool to run thecodexCLI and variousgitandghcommands. It specifically suggests using the--yoloflag, which is documented to bypass approval prompts and sandboxing, increasing the risk of unintended or malicious command execution if the agent is compromised by untrusted data. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The core functionality of the skill involves launching an autonomous agent (
codex) that dynamically generates and executes code based on natural language prompts. While this is the intended purpose, it represents a dynamic execution engine that can be targeted by adversarial inputs during its operation.
Audit Metadata