llama-cpp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to fetch content from external Hugging Face repositories and treat the extracted snippets as a "source of truth." This creates a surface where a malicious repository could influence the agent's actions.
- Ingestion points: Hugging Face model pages and API endpoints (e.g.,
huggingface.co/<repo>?local-app=llama.cpp,huggingface.co/api/models/<repo>/tree/main) are used to fetch model configuration and command snippets. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions explicitly tell the agent to "copy the exact llama-server or llama-cli command" from the external source.
- Capability inventory: The skill involves shell command execution, file system access for model management, and network operations.
- Sanitization: Absent. The instructions encourage the agent to reconstruct commands based on external quant labels and filenames without validation.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches model weights, metadata, and configuration from Hugging Face and the official llama.cpp GitHub repository. These sources are well-known and established services for the skill's intended purpose.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous instructions for executing shell commands to install software (via
brew,winget, orcmake), manage local inference servers, and run CLI tools. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The troubleshooting documentation includes instructions for using
sudo apt installto install system-level dependencies such as the NVIDIA CUDA toolkit. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill references Python scripts that use
subprocess.runto execute system tools likenvidia-smifor VRAM detection and provides a utility for inspecting GGUF file headers at runtime.
Audit Metadata