skills/keli-wen/agy-staff/agy-lead/Gen Agent Trust Hub

agy-lead

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local companion script using Node.js to delegate tasks to worker personas.
  • Evidence: node "<skill-dir>/../../companion/agy-companion.mjs" staffer --prompt-file "<brief-path>" in SKILL.md.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to operate outside of standard sandbox constraints and utilize escalated execution privileges.
  • Evidence: "Run unsandboxed as described in ../agy-jobs/references/troubleshooting.md (escalated execution in Codex)" in SKILL.md.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill functions as a coordinator that ingests and integrates output from external worker agents, creating a vulnerability where instructions embedded in worker results could influence the lead agent.
  • Ingestion points: Results gathered from the jobs mechanism as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions mandate the preservation of exact worker content (quotes, figures, errors) without specifying the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute local Node.js scripts, write briefs to temporary files, and integrate results into the primary session.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or filtering of worker-generated content is defined in the workflow.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 6, 2026, 03:31 AM