skills/keli-wen/agy-staff/ask/Gen Agent Trust Hub

ask

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to bypass security controls by running commands "unsandboxed" and requesting "escalated permissions" to access sensitive files like OAuth tokens.
  • Evidence in SKILL.md: "Run this command unsandboxed — agy needs a localhost port and its OAuth token file, which harness sandboxes hide. In Codex, request escalated permissions for the command."
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses "IMPORTANT" markers to instruct the agent to ignore standard security protocols (sandboxing) and seek higher privileges.
  • Evidence in SKILL.md: "> [!IMPORTANT]\n> Run this command unsandboxed..."
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local Node.js companion script using relative paths and user-provided arguments.
  • Evidence in SKILL.md: node "<skill-dir>/../../companion/agy-companion.mjs" ask [flags] --prompt "question"
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user input and passes it verbatim to a command-line tool, creating a vulnerability surface for command or prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: User questions passed via the --prompt flag in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; instructions explicitly state to pass the question "verbatim".
  • Capability inventory: Shell execution capabilities using node and the Bash tool.
  • Sanitization: Absent; no filtering or escaping of user input is specified.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 2, 2026, 11:27 PM