ask
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to bypass security controls by running commands "unsandboxed" and requesting "escalated permissions" to access sensitive files like OAuth tokens.
- Evidence in SKILL.md: "Run this command unsandboxed — agy needs a localhost port and its OAuth token file, which harness sandboxes hide. In Codex, request escalated permissions for the command."
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses "IMPORTANT" markers to instruct the agent to ignore standard security protocols (sandboxing) and seek higher privileges.
- Evidence in SKILL.md: "> [!IMPORTANT]\n> Run this command unsandboxed..."
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local Node.js companion script using relative paths and user-provided arguments.
- Evidence in SKILL.md:
node "<skill-dir>/../../companion/agy-companion.mjs" ask [flags] --prompt "question" - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user input and passes it verbatim to a command-line tool, creating a vulnerability surface for command or prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User questions passed via the
--promptflag in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; instructions explicitly state to pass the question "verbatim".
- Capability inventory: Shell execution capabilities using
nodeand theBashtool. - Sanitization: Absent; no filtering or escaping of user input is specified.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata