agora-reporting
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic execution of shell command output via
eval "$($AGORA_REPORT session)"inSKILL.md. This pattern allows theagoraCLI tool to generate and execute arbitrary code in the agent's shell environment at runtime, which poses a risk if the tool's output is compromised. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection by design, as it fetches and follows instructions from an external coordination server.
- Ingestion points: External data is ingested through the
$AGORA_REPORT inboxcommand described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or warnings to the model to ignore potentially malicious embedded instructions within the inbox items.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for shell command execution (via
eval) and file modifications (mentioned as 'risky or shared edits') inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the content retrieved from the Agora server before it is processed as user input.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits session details, task progress, and environment variables—including the
AGORA_TOKEN—to a remote endpoint defined byAGORA_URL. If this URL is directed to an attacker-controlled server, it facilitates the exfiltration of sensitive project context and authentication credentials.
Audit Metadata