onboard

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user responses from a conversational interface and writes them directly to local markdown files (e.g., identity.md, preferences.md) to establish a personalized context. This behavior creates an attack surface where a user (or an attacker influencing the user's input) could provide malicious instructions that are stored and subsequently followed by the agent in future interactions.
  • Ingestion points: User conversation input regarding identity, work, relationships, and preferences in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the skill lacks delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the saved context files.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to perform file-write operations to the ~/.claude/.context/core/ directory.
  • Sanitization: Absent; there is no mention of filtering, escaping, or validating the input before storage.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands to verify the environment and trigger synchronization.
  • Evidence: Direct instruction to run ls ~/.claude/.context/ in SKILL.md.
  • Evidence: Instructions to invoke the /sync-context tool or its corresponding script to update core configuration files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 9, 2026, 05:26 AM