onboard
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user responses from a conversational interface and writes them directly to local markdown files (e.g.,
identity.md,preferences.md) to establish a personalized context. This behavior creates an attack surface where a user (or an attacker influencing the user's input) could provide malicious instructions that are stored and subsequently followed by the agent in future interactions. - Ingestion points: User conversation input regarding identity, work, relationships, and preferences in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: Absent; the skill lacks delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the saved context files.
- Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to perform file-write operations to the
~/.claude/.context/core/directory. - Sanitization: Absent; there is no mention of filtering, escaping, or validating the input before storage.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands to verify the environment and trigger synchronization.
- Evidence: Direct instruction to run
ls ~/.claude/.context/in SKILL.md. - Evidence: Instructions to invoke the
/sync-contexttool or its corresponding script to update core configuration files.
Audit Metadata