spine-history
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes history logs from multiple AI tools (Codex, Claude, Cursor, OpenCode). These logs contain arbitrary text from previous sessions, including user prompts and tool outputs, which constitute untrusted data that could influence subsequent agent behavior.\n
- Ingestion points:
scripts/history.pyreads data from local directories such as~/.codex/sessions,~/.claude/projects, and SQLite databases likestore.dbvia thejson_records,parse_cursor_db, andparse_opencode_dbfunctions.\n - Boundary markers: The script does not utilize explicit boundary markers in the generated JSON output to distinguish between session data and metadata.\n
- Capability inventory: The script performs local file reads and writes. It does not perform network operations or execute arbitrary shell commands.\n
- Sanitization: The
prompt_textfunction inscripts/history.pyimplements a filter to discard strings containing potential prompt injection markers such as<system-reminder>,<rules>, or# AGENTS.md instructions.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local chat history and telemetry files from multiple development tools to aggregate them into a single file.\n - Evidence:
scripts/history.pytargets specific application paths including~/.codex/sessions,~/.claude/projects,~/.cursor, and~/.local/share/opencode.
Audit Metadata