spine-session
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes session data from
session.json, which could be provided by untrusted sources (e.g., in a cloned repository). This file contains fields likeobjective,status, andnext_actionthat define the agent's understanding of the task flow. - Ingestion points:
scripts/session.pyloads and parses thesession.jsonfile in theloadandmutatefunctions. - Boundary markers: The skill validates the JSON schema and version, but does not provide explicit markers to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the session's natural language fields.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write files, manage locks, and execute Git commands via subprocess.
- Sanitization: While the script validates field types and status enums, it does not sanitize the content of descriptive fields that are subsequently read by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
subprocessmodule to interact with the system'sgitbinary. - Evidence: The
run_gitfunction inscripts/session.pyinvokesgitwith arguments such ashead,worktree, andbaselinewhich are retrieved from the session snapshot. - Mitigation: Command execution is performed using a list of arguments without a shell (
shell=False), which effectively prevents standard shell injection attacks. The commands are restricted to thegitutility.
Audit Metadata