arena
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external tasks and shared grounding data across multiple agents and CLI-invoked models, creating a surface for indirect instructions to influence the orchestration.
- Ingestion points: In Phase B, the skill reads a "task" and "shared grounding" (from a file like
brief.md) and distributes it to parallel runners. - Boundary markers: While it uses a structured prompt "contract," it lacks explicit instructions to the sub-agents to ignore or escape instructions embedded within the user-provided grounding data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute CLI commands (
claude,codex), manage git worktrees, create temporary directories, and spawn sub-agents with varying permission levels. - Sanitization: There is no mechanism described to sanitize or validate the content of the grounding data before it is interpolated into the prompts for the various model "arms."
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides specific shell command patterns for interacting with model CLIs.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdincludes commands forcodex execandclaude -pthat utilize shell redirections (<,>) and environment variable interpolation ($OUT). These are intended for orchestration but involve direct shell interaction.
Audit Metadata