why
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a collector for historical data from various enterprise platforms, which introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection if those sources contain malicious payloads designed to manipulate AI behavior.
- Ingestion points: Evidence is gathered from commit messages, PR bodies and comments, Linear/Jira tickets, Notion/Confluence documents, Slack/Discord chat threads, Datadog/Sentry logs, and Databricks SQL query results.
- Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or boundary markers to distinguish between the agent's internal instructions and the potentially untrusted evidence retrieved from external platforms.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell commands (
git,gh,rg) and various MCP tools to search and fetch data. It also leverages subagents to synthesize findings, which could be targeted by instructions embedded in the historical record. - Sanitization: The instructions require the investigator agents to 'Quote verbatim' and provide no mechanisms for sanitizing or escaping the data before it is presented to the synthesizer agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on local shell command execution to perform its primary function of code archaeology.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandreferences/sources/code-archaeology.mddefine the use ofgit blame,git log,git show, andgh pr viewto extract implementation-time rationale. While these are standard developer tools, they are used to process and display metadata from the repository history.
Audit Metadata