protocol-browser-anti-stall
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a comprehensive suite of browser automation tools (
browser_click,browser_type,browser_navigate,browser_lock, etc.) and specifically leverages thebrowser_run_code_unsafetool to execute arbitrary JavaScript within the automation context. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The protocol manages sensitive session credentials by reading and writing browser storage states (cookies and localStorage) to local JSON files within the
.playwright-mcp/auth/directory. Although the skill correctly identifies these files as secrets and instructs users to exclude them from version control, the automated handling of session tokens on the local filesystem remains a security-sensitive operation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from external web environments through various ingestion points, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious websites could attempt to influence the agent's logic or behavior.
- Ingestion points: Web page data is ingested via
browser_snapshot,browser_console_messages, andbrowser_network_requests(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit instructions or delimiters are provided to the agent to treat external web data as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses extensive capabilities, including full browser control, form submission, and local filesystem interaction through the
browser_run_code_unsafetool (references/playwright-session-coordination.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the data retrieved from external URLs before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata