complete-everything

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill relies on searching project-specific files (plans, completion reports) and conversation history to determine the scope of work. This creates an attack surface where malicious instructions embedded in those files could influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads from .cursor/plans/, conversation logs, and existing completion reports using grep-like tools (rg).
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore instructions found within the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (for testing and verification) and write to the filesystem (.cursor/complete-everything-state.md).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation steps are defined for the data retrieved from external project files.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to "discover exact verification commands" from arbitrary files within the repository, including README.md, Makefiles, AGENTS.md, and CLAUDE.md, and to execute these discovered commands during the verification phase.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill references a mechanism that stores counters and state in the user's home directory at ~/.cache/kenji/completion-gate/. This allows the skill's state and behavior to persist across different project directories and execution sessions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 7, 2026, 11:26 PM