github-fix-ci
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/inspect_pr_checks.pyinvokes the GitHub CLI (gh) usingsubprocess.run. The command arguments are constructed as a list, which prevents shell injection. Furthermore, dynamic inputs like PR numbers are converted to integers, and run IDs are validated against a numeric regex pattern before being passed to the command. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a surface for indirect prompt injection because it retrieves and processes GitHub Action logs, which are external and potentially attacker-controlled (e.g., in a public repository PR).
- Ingestion points: The
extract_failure_snippetfunction inscripts/inspect_pr_checks.pyreads logs viagh run view --log. - Boundary markers: The extracted log snippets are presented to the agent in the
FailureSummarywithout explicit boundary delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings. - Capability inventory: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdgrant the agent the capability to propose fix plans and implement code changes based on these logs. - Sanitization: The script performs no sanitization or instruction-filtering on the logs; it only uses a regex to locate error lines for snippet extraction.
Audit Metadata