zotero-mcp-code
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing Python code from a hardcoded local directory (
/Users/niyaro/Documents/Code/zotero-code-execution). It explicitly instructs the agent to modifysys.pathto include this specific directory and import local modules such aszotero_libandsetup_paths. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from a Zotero library, including potentially large volumes of paper titles and abstracts.
- Ingestion points: Research paper data enters the agent context via functions like
orchestrator.comprehensive_searchorlibrary.search_itemsdescribed inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or warnings to treat the fetched Zotero data as untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The skill encourages the use of the code execution environment to process and filter this untrusted data.
- Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization or escaping techniques for the paper metadata before it is formatted and presented to the LLM.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The troubleshooting section in
README.mdreferences locations where sensitive user data and credentials are stored, specifically the~/.config/zotero-mcp/config.jsonfile and environment variablesZOTERO_API_KEYandZOTERO_LIBRARY_ID.
Audit Metadata