jev-frontier-work
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a specialized command-line interface (
jev ladder,jev supervise,jev lane step,jev ask) to manage task delegation and monitor execution states. These tools are central to the skill's documented purpose of managing 'frontier' model workloads. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines an attack surface by ingesting and monitoring output from external models. It addresses this risk by providing a mandatory evidence chain for the agent:
- Ingestion points: External data is read via
jev supervise --tail-fileand citations from delegated reports. - Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly mention an
injection_seenflag and advise that instructions like 'ignore previous instructions' found in data must be treated as data only. - Capability inventory: The agent uses the
jevtoolset andgrepto verify claims. - Sanitization: The skill mandates independent verification of all 'done' claims through tests or manual state checks rather than trusting model output.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: A static analysis flag was triggered by the phrase 'ignore previous instructions'. However, context confirms this is a defensive security instruction teaching the agent to recognize and disregard injection attempts in third-party data, rather than an attempt to compromise the agent itself.
Audit Metadata