jev-memory
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Transmits the user's query and segments of retrieved text (up to 900 characters per passage) to an external service referred to as 'Jev' for reranking and injection screening.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructs the agent to pipe JSON data into the
jev rerankcommand-line utility to perform passage ranking. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Provides instructions to execute a local Python script (
evals/context-filter/regret.py) for evaluating retrieval performance. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted content from external sources such as web searches, wikis, and memory stores, serving as a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Content is retrieved from external sources like
session_search, wiki, and web, then passed to the filter as candidates inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses structured output fields such as
selected_ids,dropped_injection_ids, andunjudged_ids, and provides explicit instructions for the agent to treat unvetted IDs as untrusted text. - Capability inventory: Uses a command-line tool (
jev rerank) and a Python script (evals/context-filter/regret.py) for filtering and performance assessment. - Sanitization: Implements pattern-based masking for PII (emails, phone numbers, tokens), length clipping of passages to 900 characters, and a local pattern-based screen for known injection signatures.
Audit Metadata