team-ui
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its data ingestion process. It reads external files and provides their content as context to subagents using the
Tasktool. - Ingestion points: Multiple files including
production/review-mode.txt,design/gdd/game-concept.md,design/player-journey.md,design/ux/interaction-patterns.md, and.claude/docs/technical-preferences.mdare processed and their contents are passed into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters (such as XML tags or special markers) to isolate ingested file content from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses a powerful set of tools, including
Bash,Task,Write,Edit, andTodoWrite, which could be targeted if a subagent is successfully influenced by malicious data. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or validation for the content read from these external files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
BashandTasktools to orchestrate workflows and spawn subagents likegamedev:ux-designerandgamedev:ui-programmer. Notably, thesubagent_typefor the engine UI specialist is dynamically determined by reading the.claude/docs/technical-preferences.mdfile. This creates a control-flow risk where a user or an external process modifying that configuration file could cause the orchestrator to spawn an unintended or malicious subagent.
Audit Metadata