skills/kessriga/game-studio/team-ui/Gen Agent Trust Hub

team-ui

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 24, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its data ingestion process. It reads external files and provides their content as context to subagents using the Task tool.
  • Ingestion points: Multiple files including production/review-mode.txt, design/gdd/game-concept.md, design/player-journey.md, design/ux/interaction-patterns.md, and .claude/docs/technical-preferences.md are processed and their contents are passed into the agent's context.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters (such as XML tags or special markers) to isolate ingested file content from the agent's core instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses a powerful set of tools, including Bash, Task, Write, Edit, and TodoWrite, which could be targeted if a subagent is successfully influenced by malicious data.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or validation for the content read from these external files.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the Bash and Task tools to orchestrate workflows and spawn subagents like gamedev:ux-designer and gamedev:ui-programmer. Notably, the subagent_type for the engine UI specialist is dynamically determined by reading the .claude/docs/technical-preferences.md file. This creates a control-flow risk where a user or an external process modifying that configuration file could cause the orchestrator to spawn an unintended or malicious subagent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 24, 2026, 04:18 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — team-ui