youtube-to-heygen-video
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through its core functionality of analyzing external YouTube videos.
- Ingestion points: The
youtube_urlprovided by the user is passed directly to the Gemini API inscripts/youtube_to_heygen_video.pyfor content analysis. - Boundary markers: Absent. The
SCRIPT_EXTRACTION_PROMPTprovides strict instructions to the model but does not wrap the external data in delimiters or include instructions to ignore embedded commands within the video content. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to a PostgreSQL database (
psycopg2) and send generated data to the HeyGen API (requests.post). - Sanitization: Absent. The script performs basic character replacement (removing newlines) but does not validate the LLM output for adversarial instructions before using it in subsequent API calls.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs network operations to external services to fulfill its purpose.
- Evidence: It sends requests to the HeyGen API (
api.heygen.com) and interacts with the Google Gemini API. While these are well-known services, they constitute external data flow from the agent's environment. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill follows secure practices for credential management.
- Evidence: Both
SKILL.mdand the Python implementation correctly instruct the user to store sensitive tokens likeGEMINI_API_KEY,HEYGEN_API_KEY, andDATABASE_URLin environment variables or a.envfile, avoiding hardcoded secrets in the code.
Audit Metadata