reverse-engineer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
study.pyandscaffold_skill.pyscripts utilizesubprocess.runto execute various system utilities likeffmpeg,ffprobe,yt-dlp, andwhisper. The use of list-based arguments for these calls helps prevent shell command injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads video files from external URLs provided by the user using the
yt-dlptool. Additionally, it contains logic to trigger a self-update of theyt-dlpbinary via the-Uflag if it encounters a 403 error during download. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]:
scaffold_skill.pydynamically generates a new skill structure, including aSKILL.mdfile and arender_template.pyscript. It populates these files using data extracted from the video analysis and copies existing template files from other skill directories. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during the analysis phase.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read the
audio/transcript.txtfile (generated via Whisper) and visual frame sheets (frames/*.jpg) to perform its style analysis. - Boundary markers: There are no protective boundary markers or instructions to the agent to disregard embedded commands in the analyzed content.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment allows for filesystem writes and command execution through the provided scripts.
- Sanitization: The external content is not sanitized before the agent is prompted to read and act upon it.
Audit Metadata