agtask
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes Markdown files from the local filesystem to create new tasks, which introduces a surface for untrusted data to influence the agent's instructions. Ingestion occurs in
references/create-from-markdown.mdvia the$dendrontool. The skill attempts to mitigate this using specific boundary markers, including aTask:header and a structured<agtask-bootstrap version="2">JSON trailer. The agent's capabilities to execute CLI commands and manage thread lifecycles are exposed to this ingested content. Sanitization is limited to paraphrasing and CLI-side prompt normalization. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill configures multiple agent hooks in
assets/hooks.jsonforSessionStart,UserPromptSubmit,Stop, andPostCompact. These hooks execute a local CLI tool to monitor and record turn history in the ledger database, providing persistent activity tracking across sessions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflows frequently execute a local Python CLI (
./scripts/agtask) to interact with the task ledger, manage Git worktrees, and perform project lookups. Theinstall-skillscript also executes theskillzCLI and handles local file writes to~/skillz.jsonto register the skill. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: In
references/audit.md, the skill describes a 'Sites mode' that interacts with Cloudflare D1, a well-known hosted database service, for managing tasks. This involves network communication with external infrastructure for task state auditing. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The
assets/hooks.jsonfile and theinstall-skillscript contain hardcoded absolute file paths specific to the author's local environment, which may cause configuration issues or unexpected behavior in different environments.
Audit Metadata