skills/kevinslin/agstack/agtask/Gen Agent Trust Hub

agtask

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes Markdown files from the local filesystem to create new tasks, which introduces a surface for untrusted data to influence the agent's instructions. Ingestion occurs in references/create-from-markdown.md via the $dendron tool. The skill attempts to mitigate this using specific boundary markers, including a Task: header and a structured <agtask-bootstrap version="2"> JSON trailer. The agent's capabilities to execute CLI commands and manage thread lifecycles are exposed to this ingested content. Sanitization is limited to paraphrasing and CLI-side prompt normalization.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill configures multiple agent hooks in assets/hooks.json for SessionStart, UserPromptSubmit, Stop, and PostCompact. These hooks execute a local CLI tool to monitor and record turn history in the ledger database, providing persistent activity tracking across sessions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflows frequently execute a local Python CLI (./scripts/agtask) to interact with the task ledger, manage Git worktrees, and perform project lookups. The install-skill script also executes the skillz CLI and handles local file writes to ~/skillz.json to register the skill.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: In references/audit.md, the skill describes a 'Sites mode' that interacts with Cloudflare D1, a well-known hosted database service, for managing tasks. This involves network communication with external infrastructure for task state auditing.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: The assets/hooks.json file and the install-skill script contain hardcoded absolute file paths specific to the author's local environment, which may cause configuration issues or unexpected behavior in different environments.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 8, 2026, 07:26 AM