skills/kevinslin/agstack/slack-notify/Gen Agent Trust Hub

slack-notify

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script executes the slack-post CLI tool and a sibling secrets helper script located at ../../secrets/scripts/secrets to manage its environment and post messages.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages sensitive credentials including SLACK_TOKEN and SLACK_BOT_TOKEN stored in the local file ~/.secrets/.env.slack. It includes explicit safety instructions to prevent the agent from printing or echoing these secret values in the chat.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-provided text to send as Slack notifications, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection. A malicious input could attempt to bypass constraints or misrepresent the source of a message.\n
  • Ingestion points: The slack-notify script accepts message content via command-line arguments and standard input in scripts/slack-notify.\n
  • Boundary markers: The instructions specify confirming user intent but do not define specific delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' markers for the message payload.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute local scripts, invoke the slack-post tool, and read environment variables via the secrets helper.\n
  • Sanitization: User arguments are handled using standard shell quoting to prevent local command injection, but the message content is passed directly to the notification tool without sanitization for downstream platforms.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 8, 2026, 07:26 AM