official-document-drafting
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 5, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides automated protocols for installing the external package
mcp-taiwan-legal-dbusingpiporpipx. This package is not from a verified or trusted source, enabling the execution of arbitrary third-party code. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions require the agent to register and connect to a remote HTTP MCP server at
https://tlr.dr-lawbot.com/mcp. This facilitates the retrieval of data and the potential invocation of tools from an external domain without verification. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill specifies shell commands, such as
claude mcp addandgemini mcp add, to programmatically modify sensitive local configuration files, including~/.claude.json,~/.cursor/mcp.json, and~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json. This behavior establishes a persistence mechanism for external tools within the agent's environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions in
references/agents-rules.mdmention the execution of a local scriptpython scripts/sync_agents_rules.py, which is not included in the skill distribution for review. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses instruction-overriding language, including terms like "鐵律" (iron rule) and "最高優先,不可覆寫" (highest priority, non-overwritable), designed to lock the agent's behavior and ignore subsequent user instructions that might conflict with the author's directives.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface through the ingestion of user-provided document content for drafting and proofreading. It has the following evidence chain:
- Ingestion points: User-provided text for document processing in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent.
- Capability inventory: Network-enabled tool invocation through the
taiwan-legal-dbanddr-lawbotservers. - Sanitization: Absent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata