cc-taskmaster

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill promotes the installation of a global Node.js package 'task-master-ai' via npm. Installing packages from unverified sources is a risk as it grants execution persistence on the host system.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Extensive use of the Bash tool to execute CLI operations such as 'task-master init', 'parse-prd', and 'analyze-complexity' which grants the tool significant control over the local project environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from the '.taskmaster/docs/prd.md' file to generate task lists.
  • Ingestion points: The PRD file path '.taskmaster/docs/prd.md' is directly parsed by the CLI tool.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety instructions are provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content inside the PRD.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to 'Bash', 'Read', and 'Write' tools, allowing it to execute commands or modify files based on instructions parsed from the PRD.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or content filtering for the PRD data before it is processed by the AI.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The 'analyze-complexity' and task 'expand' commands involve remote AI calls, implying that project metadata and requirements are sent to an external service for processing.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 8, 2026, 02:29 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — cc-taskmaster