init-decision-tree
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local shell commands to facilitate project detection and session management.
- Evidence: Uses
ls -t ~/.claude/sessions/*-session.tmpto list and sort previous session files. - Evidence: Reads the first 10 lines of session files to extract metadata like project names and topics.
- Evidence: Executes standard development tools such as
npm,pnpm,git, andnodethrough generated permission settings in.claude/settings.json. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses potentially sensitive local files for configuration and session resumption. While no network exfiltration was found, the access scope includes sensitive directories.
- Evidence: Scans
~/.claude/sessions/for temporary session data. - Evidence: Detects environment variable names from
.env,.env.example, and.env.localto populate theCLAUDE.mdfile. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it incorporates content from untrusted local files into the agent's context.
- Ingestion points: Reads
package.json,README.md,gitremote URLs, and session files during the auto-detection phase inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested files are present.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files (
CLAUDE.md,tasks/todo.md,.claude/settings.json) and execute shell commands (git,npm, etc.). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the content read from local project files is performed before interpolation into the generated documentation.
Audit Metadata