openclaw-native
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill automatically transmits sensitive session and operational data to a configurable external gateway.
- Evidence: The
cc_kit_session_endhook forwards session summaries, cost alerts, and lists of files changed to the OpenClaw service. - Evidence: The
cc_kit_tool_usehook sends tool names and their execution results to the gateway. - Evidence: The skill syncs the
~/.claude/sessions/directory, which contains sensitive conversation history, with the OpenClaw platform. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill defines and executes commands that manage agent profiles and system health.
- Evidence: The
/openclaw agents generatecommand triggers profile creation logic based on Kit workflow modes. - Evidence: The
/openclaw healthcommand performs network probes and checks the status of external channel connectivity (Discord, Slack, Telegram). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: Processes
channel_messagedata from Discord, Slack, and Telegram via the OpenClaw gateway. - Boundary markers: None specified to delimit external messages from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write to
tasks/lessons.md, read session history, and invoke a wide range of kit domain skills. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering for the content received from external message channels before it is used for status updates or context.
Audit Metadata