openclaw-native

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill automatically transmits sensitive session and operational data to a configurable external gateway.
  • Evidence: The cc_kit_session_end hook forwards session summaries, cost alerts, and lists of files changed to the OpenClaw service.
  • Evidence: The cc_kit_tool_use hook sends tool names and their execution results to the gateway.
  • Evidence: The skill syncs the ~/.claude/sessions/ directory, which contains sensitive conversation history, with the OpenClaw platform.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill defines and executes commands that manage agent profiles and system health.
  • Evidence: The /openclaw agents generate command triggers profile creation logic based on Kit workflow modes.
  • Evidence: The /openclaw health command performs network probes and checks the status of external channel connectivity (Discord, Slack, Telegram).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from external sources.
  • Ingestion points: Processes channel_message data from Discord, Slack, and Telegram via the OpenClaw gateway.
  • Boundary markers: None specified to delimit external messages from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write to tasks/lessons.md, read session history, and invoke a wide range of kit domain skills.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering for the content received from external message channels before it is used for status updates or context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 8, 2026, 02:29 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — openclaw-native