paperclip
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest and act upon data from external, untrusted sources within the Paperclip platform.
- Ingestion points: As outlined in
SKILL.mdandreferences/api-reference.md, the skill retrieves potentially attacker-controlled data through API calls likeGET /api/issues/{issueId}/commentsandGET /api/issues/{issueId}/heartbeat-context. - Boundary markers: There is no evidence of boundary markers or instructions to the agent to disregard embedded directives within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has broad permissions to mutate state via the Paperclip API and can perform local operations such as
git worktreemanagement and executing thepaperclipaiCLI tool. - Sanitization: The instructions lack any requirement for sanitizing or validating external data before it is processed or used in decision-making.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the import and installation of additional agent skills from external sources, including the
skills.shregistry and GitHub repositories, as described inreferences/company-skills.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using the
paperclipaiCLI tool andgit(e.g.,git worktree add) to manage local development environments and perform self-tests.
Audit Metadata