pptx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Runtime compilation and injection of shared libraries.
- The script
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains hardcoded C source code which it writes to a temporary file and compiles into a shared object library (lo_socket_shim.so) usinggccat runtime. - This library is then injected into the LibreOffice (
soffice) process via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to intercept and redirect AF_UNIX socket calls. This is a high-complexity behavioral pattern. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Execution of external CLI tools.
- The skill makes extensive use of
subprocess.runto invoke system utilities includingsoffice,pdftoppm,git, andgccacross multiple scripts (thumbnail.py,soffice.py, andredlining.py). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface through untrusted file processing.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads and parses XML content from user-supplied
.pptxfiles inscripts/office/unpack.pyand thescripts/office/validators/directory. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or include warnings for the agent to ignore instructions found within presentation XML files.
- Capability inventory: The environment provides access to powerful tools like
gccandgit, which could be abused if the agent is manipulated by malicious content within a processed presentation. - Sanitization: While
defusedxmlis used in several components to mitigate XXE, it does not prevent logic-based prompt injection.
Audit Metadata